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NOTES
EXTRAORDINARY (CIRCUMSTANCES)
INJUSTICE
MELISSA CAPALBO†
INTRODUCTION
The box . . . . It’s a small room, so you really don’t move
around a lot. You wake up, and there’s a toilet right next to
your head. You look out the window and you see birds flying, and that only leads your mind into wanting freedom
more. And since it’s a small room, it makes you think crazy. . . . Right now, I’m five-foot-seven. I grew. I came here
when I was five feet tall.1

This is Rikers Island. The 19-year-old boy who shared his
story is certainly not alone. Thousands of youth from throughout
New York State grew up incarcerated on Rikers Island, which is
among the “world’s worst” correctional facilities.2 Since its
historic opening in the 1930s, the facility has been plagued by
“drug use, corrupt correction officers, violence, squalor, [and]
gang consolidation.”3 Yet, it is the same place that New York has
allowed children to call their home for the last several decades.
In 2015, Governor Andrew Cuomo raised awareness for the
significant problem of treating “troubled kids” as adults and
declared, in his Raise the Age campaign, that the minimum age
for criminal responsibility “must change.”4

†
Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review, J.D. Candidate, 2021, St. John’s
University School of Law; B.A., 2018, University of New Haven.
1
Maurice Chammah, et al., Inside Rikers Island, Through the Eyes of the People
Who Live and Work There, N.Y. MAG., June 28, 2015, at 4–5.
2
Id. at 1.
3
Id.
4
Press Release, Andrew Cuomo, Governor, New York, Governor Cuomo
Launches Campaign Rallying Support to “Raise the Age” in New York (Mar. 9,
2015),
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-launches-campaignrallying-support-raise-age-new-york [https://perma.cc/E6ZJ-J6NZ].
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In 2017, the New York Legislature raised the age of criminal
responsibility from sixteen years old to eighteen years old but left
a substantial loophole.
The phrase “extraordinary
circumstances” within its Raise the Age (“RTA”) legislation
provides this gray area, as the statute reads, “[t]he court shall
deny the motion to prevent removal of the action in [the] youth
part unless the court makes a determination upon such motion
by the district attorney that extraordinary circumstances exist
that should prevent the transfer of the action to family court.”5
Since the Legislature failed to define what factors to examine or
specify crimes that constitute such a finding, the phrase has been
applied both broadly and arbitrarily. With little guidance, courts
have examined factors such as prior juvenile history—in
violation of the Family Court Act6—as well as culpability—at
odds with the presumption of innocence.7 Moreover, some courts
have used mental illness as a way to entirely mitigate a finding
of extraordinary circumstances, perhaps believing the juvenile
justice system is more equipped to handle mental illness.8
Part I of this Note will provide an overview of the history of
the juvenile justice system using a four-wave approach, as
categorized by the National Campaign to Reform State Juvenile
Justice Systems.9 It will focus on New York specifically as it
pertains to the fourth, and current, wave of reform. Part II will
outline the problems caused by the Legislature’s failure to define
“extraordinary circumstances.” It will detail the ways in which
courts have struggled to determine factors to examine and how to
use those factors, specifically focusing on prior juvenile history,
culpability, and mental illness. Lastly, Part III will explore the
possibilities for change through the lens of Connecticut and
Pennsylvania’s RTA statutes, suggesting a set of appropriate
factors to examine when deciding if extraordinary circumstances
exist. Further, it will explore new ways to approach mental
illness among alleged youthful offenders and suggest blended
sentencing laws as a way to mitigate various problems associated
with a preliminary assessment of culpability.

5

N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. LAW § 722.23(1)(d) (McKinney 2019) (emphasis added).
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 381.2(2) (McKinney 1983).
7
See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 366 (1970).
8
People v. D.L., 62 Misc. 3d 900, 907 (Family Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2018).
9
GIUDI WEISS, NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO REFORM STATE JUV. JUST. SYS., THE
FOURTH WAVE: JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORMS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 3–4
(2013).
6
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I. HISTORY OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
A.

Four Waves of Reform

Juvenile justice reform has been categorized into four
“waves,” beginning in the late nineteenth century.10 The first
wave began in 1899 in Chicago when the earliest juvenile court
was established to “provide rehabilitation and protective
supervision for youth.”11 In the twentieth century, scientific
advancements led to studies of the differences in brain activity
between adults and children that suggested youth are less
mature and less capable of understanding the consequences of
their behavior.12 In addition, scientific evidence supported that
youth are “prime candidates for rehabilitation” and thus should
generally be kept out of the criminal justice system.13
Consequently, other states began to follow the trend of treating
youth separately from adults in the criminal justice system.14
By 1925, forty-six states had established juvenile courts.15
Generally, these courts were informal, handling only minor
alleged offenses, and judges played the role of “child
supervis[ors].”16 This setting was “intended to be a place where
the child would receive individualized attention from a concerned
judge.”17 Moreover, “delinquency [was treated] as a social
problem instead of as a crime.”18 Unfortunately, due to a large
influx of youth into these juvenile courts, and early goals of
rehabilitation having proven hard to achieve, many youths were
incarcerated and committed to juvenile detention centers.19 The
reversion to the former policy of treating children as adults was

10

Id. at 3.
Juvenile
Justice
History,
CTR.
ON
JUV.
AND
CRIM.
JUST.,
http://www.cjcj.org/education1/juvenile-justice-history.html [https://perma.cc/2QY6PGCE ] (last visited Feb. 28, 2021).
12
Samantha Mumola, Comment, The Concrete Jungle: Where Dreams Are Made
of . . . and Now Where Children Are Protected, 39 PACE L. REV. 539, 544–545 (2018).
13
Id. at 545.
14
Juvenile Justice History, supra note 11.
15
CHRISTOPHER A. MALLETT & MIYUKI FUKUSHIMA TEDOR, JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY: PATHWAYS AND PREVENTION 30 (2019).
16
Id.
17
Juvenile Justice History, supra note 11.
18
MALLETT & TEDOR, supra note 15, at 31. Around this time, juvenile
delinquency was defined for the first time. Id. at 30. For example, an Oregon law
defined these children as “truant, idle, and disorderly.” Id.
19
Id. at 31.
11
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attributed to the misguided consensus that “nothing works” to
rehabilitate juvenile offenders.20
As incarceration became the preferred method of disposition,
juvenile detention facilities were recognized as overcrowded and
lacked much of the rehabilitative services that states had been
previously focused on, including therapy and group treatment.21
Conditions in the areas of food, hygiene, clothing, and living
accommodations—all essential components of basic humane
treatment—were deplorable and inadequate.22 Consequently, the
declining physical and mental health of incarcerated youth
developed into a serious problem.23
Moreover, although children were being treated as adults,
they were barred from the same legal protections because of the
location of the proceedings.24 Scholars at the time debated
whether children should enjoy the same constitutional
safeguards as adults.25
The leading justification for the
distinction was the nature of the new system to act “in loco
parentis”26 based on the legal doctrine of parens patriae, meaning
“State as Parent,” giving the State the sole authority to protect a
child in his person and property.27 Another justification was that
a child was not entitled to such protections because he was just
that, a child.28 Nonetheless, the juvenile justice system was
plagued with a lack of clear standards of fairness.29 As a result, a
new social and political movement began for more fair and
humane treatment of alleged, youthful offenders.30

20

Id. at 33.
Id. at 32.
22
Dale G. Parent, Conditions of Confinement, 1 JUV. JUST. 2, 3 (1993).
23
Id. at 6. The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency prevention reported
that “Suicidal behavior was a serious problem in juvenile facilities. In 1990, 10
juveniles in confinement killed themselves, a rate roughly double that of youth in
the general population.” Id. Another 1.6 % of the juveniles in confinement committed
some form of suicidal act in the past thirty days of completing a survey. Id.
24
MALLETT & TEDOR, supra note 15, at 33.
25
Karen L. Atkinson, Constitutional Rights of Juveniles: Gault and Its
Application, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 492, 494 (1967).
26
Id. at 493.
27
Juvenile Justice History, supra note 11.
28
Atkinson, supra note 25, at 493.
29
Id. at 494.
30
MALLETT & TEDOR, supra note 15, at 32. Critics argued, “juvenile courts could
no longer justify their broad disposition powers and invasion of personal rights on
humanitarian grounds.” Id. at 33.
21
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The second wave began in the 1960s,31 when the U.S.
Supreme Court began solidifying the juvenile justice system by
extending youth’s due process rights, including the right to
counsel and the right to remain silent.32 In 1967, in In Re Gault,
the Court came to an important decision concerning juvenile
justice reform.33 There, the Court held that a fifteen-year-old
boy’s rights were violated when the police arrested him and
failed to notify his parents or advise him of the right to counsel
and the right against self-incrimination during questioning.34
Despite the movement toward establishing a stable juvenile
justice system, juvenile offending statistics in the 1980s and
1990s were alarmingly high, specifically for violent crime.35
Public outrage grew concerning the lack of punishment for
youthful offenders, paving the way for the third wave of reform,36
punitive laws “designed to get tough on juvenile crime.”37
During the “tough on crime” era, transfer laws were, in
essence, a mechanism to transfer youth from the juvenile justice
system to the criminal justice system for prosecution.38 Reforms
made transfers to criminal proceedings much easier by
“lower[ing] the minimum age for transfer, increas[ing] the
number of transfer-eligible offenses, or expand[ing] prosecutorial
discretion and reduc[ing] judicial discretion in transfer

31

WEISS, supra note 9, at 3.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967). As Justice Black explained in his
concurring opinion,
[w]here a person, infant or adult, can be seized by the State, charged, and
convicted for violating a state criminal law, and then ordered by the State
to be confined for six years, I think the Constitution requires that he be
tried in accordance with the guarantees of all the provisions of the Bill of
Rights made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 61 (Black, J., concurring). Around the same time, juveniles were also provided
with Fourth Amendment protections of search and seizure and the right to a
probable cause hearing pursuant to a warrantless arrest. See New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985); Moss v. Weaver, 525 F.2d 1258, 1260 (5th Cir. 1976).
33
387 U.S. at 55–56.
34
Id.
35
CHARLES PUZZANCHERA, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. AND DELINQ. PREVENTION,
JUVENILE ARRESTS 2008, at 5 (2009). For example, juvenile arrest rates for murder
more than doubled from the mid 1980s to around 1993; arrest rates for aggravated
assault doubled between 1980 and 1994; arrest rates for forcible rape were at an alltime high in 1991; and robbery arrest rates grew substantially between the 1980s
and mid-1990s. Id. at 6.
36
WEISS, supra note 9, at 3.
37
RICHARD E. REDDING, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. AND DELINQ. PREVENTION,
JUVENILE TRANSFER LAWS: AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT TO DELINQUENCY? 1 (2010).
38
Id.
32
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decisionmaking.”39 Beginning in the 1980s, nearly every state
adopted transfer laws of various sorts.40
The main types of transfer laws fall into three categories:
(1) judicial waiver laws; (2) prosecutorial discretion or concurrent
jurisdiction laws; and (3) statutory exclusion laws.41 First, states
with judicial waiver laws allow, on a case-by-case basis, juvenile
courts to waive jurisdiction and transfer the case for criminal
Second, prosecutorial discretion laws allow
prosecution.42
prosecutors the sole ability to determine whether a case involving
youth should be brought under juvenile or criminal court
jurisdiction.43 Lastly, statutory exclusion laws allow criminal
courts exclusive jurisdiction over youth cases.44 Additionally,
many states also have “once adult/always adult” laws, reverse
waiver laws, and blended sentencing laws.45 Once adult/always
adult laws entail the automatic exclusion of youth from the
juvenile justice system if they have been “criminally prosecuted
in the past.”46 Reverse waiver laws allow youth, whose cases
begin in the criminal justice system, to petition to have their
cases transferred to the juvenile courts.47 Lastly, blended
sentencing laws allow judges discretion to impose criminal
sentences on juveniles if the case is in the juvenile courts, or
impose juvenile dispositions if the case is in the criminal justice
system.48
The justification for these new reforms was based on the idea
that punishment deters juvenile crime.49 However, studies
conducted in the late 1990s and early 2000s revealed that
“[j]uveniles with the highest recidivism rates were those who

39

Id.
PATRICK GRIFFIN ET. AL., OFF. OF JUV. JUST. AND DELINQ. PREVENTION,
TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER LAWS AND
REPORTING 2 (2011).
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
REDDING, supra note 37, at 2. Deterrence can be measured by general
deterrence—which seeks to deter any “would-be juvenile offenders”—or specific
deterrence—which seeks to deter specific individuals from recidivating (commonly
measured by rearrests). Id. at 2, 4.
40
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were incarcerated after being tried in the criminal court.”50 It
soon became evident that the new practice of transferring youth
had an unintended effect of promoting criminality among young
people.51 In 2005, the Supreme Court revisited the issues within
the juvenile justice system in Roper v. Simmons, holding that
youth under the age of eighteen are ineligible for the death
penalty because “that is the point where society draws the line
for many purposes between childhood and adulthood.” 52 The
holding sparked new awareness and inspired new reforms across
the country.53 Consequently, states sought to reverse the damage
done by transfer laws by raising the age of juvenile court
jurisdiction.54 This marked the beginning of the fourth and
current wave “aimed at holding young offenders accountable for
their actions in developmentally appropriate ways[,] reducing
reoffending[,] and ensuring public safety.”55
B.

New York’s Fourth Wave

Throughout the twentieth century, New York prided itself on
being a progressive leader in the development of juvenile
justice.56 In 1903, the Legislature created separate youth “parts”
in the Superior Court, and in 1909 passed a law mandating that
a child under the age of sixteen could not be tried as an adult
unless charged with a capital offense.57 The most notable reform
came in 1962 when the Legislature passed the Family Court Act,
“establish[ing] a single Family Court to manage cases affecting
the family, including juvenile delinquency cases, neglected
50

Id. at 4. For example, a study by Fagan in 1996 revealed that 91 percent of
youth who were prosecuted for robbery in criminal court recidivated, but only 73
percent of youth who were prosecuted for the same crime in juvenile court
recidivated. Id.
51
Id.
52
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 554 (2005).
53
Mumola, supra note 12, at 548.
54
COMM’N ON YOUTH, PUB. SAFETY & JUST., FINAL REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S
COMMISSION ON YOUTH, PUBLIC SAFETY AND JUSTICE 3 (2015) [hereinafter FINAL
REPORT], https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/ReportofCo
mmissiononYouthPublicSafetyandJustice_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AEW-R3MJ].
55
WEISS, supra note 9, at 3–4.
56
FINAL REPORT, supra note 54.
57
Id. A “part” is a specialized, segregated court within the NYS court system.
Supreme Court, Criminal Term, New York County: About the Court, NYCOURTS.GOV,
http://ww2.nycourts.gov/courts/1jd/criminal/about.shtml [https://perma.cc/2VY5-5AZM]
(last visited Feb. 28, 2021). For example, the Supreme Court, Criminal Term is divided
into multiple parts, including an integrated domestic violence part, a mental health part,
a narcotics part, and a youth part. Id.
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children cases, cases involving persons in need of supervision,
and cases involving paternity, custody, adoption, and related
issues.”58 More reforms followed in the 1970s, including the
Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1976, which required Family
Court judges to consider the best interests of the child and the
need to protect the community.59 However, as the country
entered the fourth wave of reform, New York State suddenly
became a static outlier.60 While a majority of states raised the
age of adult criminal responsibility to seventeen years old, New
York remained one of only two states that “still treated sixteenyear-olds as adults in the eyes of the law.”61
In 2013, New York’s Adolescent Diversion Program,
launched one year earlier, had revealed “promising result[s]” for
change.62 The State then officially launched the Raise the Age
campaign.63 Governor Cuomo made the campaign a top priority,
traveling around the state, raising awareness, and establishing a
Commission on Youth, Public Safety, and Justice.64 The tragic
passing of Kalief Browder—a sixteen-year-old boy who took his
own life after being held at Rikers Island for a suspected robbery
for over 1,000 days, 700 of which were spent in solitary
confinement65—led to public outrage and helped the movement
gain momentum.66 After years of campaigning, the New York
State Raise the Age bill was signed into law on April 10, 2017.67

58

FINAL REPORT, supra note 54, at 4 (footnote omitted).
Id.
60
Id. at 3–4.
61
Mumola, supra note 12, at 542. Numerous states, including Massachusetts,
had even raised the age requirement to eighteen years old, and Vermont was the
first state to raise the age to twenty-one years old. Aidan Ryan, Crime Bill Would
Redefine Juveniles as up to Age 21, BOS. GLOBE (July 9, 2019, 8:14 PM),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2019/07/09/crime-bill-would-redefine-juvenilesage/maHshbBT6QaaX9ooVDVidN/story.html.
62
Mumola, supra note 12, at 548. Studies of the program found a “decreased rearrest rate for felonies coupled with an absence of harm to public safety.” Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 548–49.
65
Id. at 540–41.
66
Id. at 549.
67
Id.
59
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New York’s RTA

The New York Legislature successfully raised the age of
criminal responsibility to eighteen years old.68 The new law
called for implementation in two waves: the first wave raised the
age to seventeen years old on October 1, 2018, and the second
wave raised the age to eighteen years old beginning on October 1,
2019.69 Youths charged with crimes are now placed into one of
four categories: (1) Juvenile Delinquent (“JD”); (2) Juvenile
Offenders
(“JO”);
(3) Youthful
Offender
(“YO”);
and
(4) Adolescent Offenders (“AO”)—a new category under RTA
classifying sixteen and seventeen-year-olds who are charged with
felonies.70 Most notably, RTA categorized sixteen and seventeen
year olds depending on the type of crime charged.71 For example,
alleged non-criminal violations, such as vehicle and traffic
violations, are automatically sent to local courts.72 AOs who are
charged with New York Penal Law misdemeanors are
automatically sent to Family Court.73 AOs who are charged with
felonies, on the other hand, are subject to a complex procedure,
depending on a variety of factors.74
When an AO is charged with a violent felony, the case begins
in the Youth Part.75
However, RTA created a three-part

68

Raise
the
Age
(RTA),
NYCOURTS.GOV,
https://www.nycourts.gov/courthelp/Criminal/RTA.shtml [https://perma.cc/BH6H5XHJ] (last updated Dec. 23, 2019).
69
Id. The gradual shift was to slowly prepare both systems for the extraordinary
change.
70
Crimes Committed by Children Between 7–18, NYCOURTS.GOV,
https://www.nycourts.gov/courthelp/Criminal/crimesByChildren.shtml
[https://perma.cc/UT5J-29T6] (last updated Dec. 23, 2019). Before Raise the Age
(“RTA”), a child who was at least seven years old but under sixteen years old was
considered a juvenile delinquent, and cases were adjudicated in Family Court. Id. A
child who is between the ages of thirteen and fifteen and commits a serious felony is
considered a juvenile offender. Id. Juvenile offender cases are adjudicated in the
Youth Part of Supreme or County court but may be transferred to Family Court. Id.
A child who is at least fourteen years old but under nineteen may be treated as a
youthful offender and may be eligible, subject to certain requirements, to have their
records automatically sealed. Id.
71
Raise
the
Age
(RTA),
NYCOURTS.GOV,
https://www.nycourts.gov/courthelp/Criminal/RTA.shtml [https://perma.cc/BH6H5XHJ] (last updated Dec. 23, 2019).
72
Raise
the
Age
Flowchart,
NYCOURTS.GOV,
https://www.nycourts.gov/courthelp/pdfs/RTA_flowchart.pdf [https://perma.cc/XC5CSHDW] (last visited Feb. 28, 2021).
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
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statutory test to determine whether the case is eligible for
transfer to Family Court.76 The court will evaluate cases for a
crime involving: (1) significant physical injury; (2) display of a
weapon; or (3) sex offenses.77 If one or more of these factors are
present, the case will remain in the Youth Part for adjudication,
unless the District Attorney (“DA”) consents to transfer the case
If no factor is present, the case will
to Family Court.78
automatically be transferred to Family Court, unless the DA files
a motion within thirty days to block the transfer.79 The standard
for this motion is a showing of “extraordinary circumstances,”
such that the case must remain in the Youth Part.80 If the DA
succeeds in showing extraordinary circumstances, the case will
remain.81
When an AO is charged with a non-violent felony, the case
also begins in the Youth Part.82 The case is automatically
transferred from the Youth Part to Family Court unless the DA
files a motion to block the transfer within thirty days.83 Again,
the standard for this motion to block the transfer is a showing of
extraordinary circumstances.84 If the DA succeeds in showing
extraordinary circumstances, the case remains in the Youth
RTA created this new statutory standard of
Part.85
“extraordinary circumstances,”86 leaving an enormous amount of
discretion to courts, but very little guidance, which has recently
caused concern among the legal community.87 Part II of this
Note will explore this new legislation’s undefined phrase,
focusing on the courts’ consideration of certain factors including
prior juvenile history, culpability, and mental illness.

76

Id.
See id.
78
Id.
79
See id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. Enormous discretion is also granted to the District Attorney’s (“DA”) office,
in that they have the opportunity to transfer cases to Family Court, despite a finding
of one or more statutory factors. See id.
86
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 722.23 (McKinney 2019).
87
See Jonathan Lippman, Criminal Justice Reform is Not for the Short-Winded:
How the Judiciary’s Proactive Pursuit of Justice Helped Achieve “Raise the Age”
Reform in New York, 45 FORD. URB. L.J. 241, 279 n.226 (2017).
77
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II. WHAT ARE EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES?
A.

New York’s Gray Area

RTA’s undefined standard of “extraordinary circumstances”
has been considered “one of the largest gray areas present within
the new law” because of the extraordinary discretion granted to
courts.88
Commentators recognize that this could “prove
disastrous if given a broad interpretation”89 and essentially gives
the State “discretion to ignore their own age restrictions.”90 For
example, one commentator explained,
[O]n one hand, the new law expands an adult court judge’s
authority to impose a therapeutic position toward young teens;
however, on the other hand, the discretion presented in this
situation could allow a judge to rule consistent with past
approaches by holding in favor of the District Attorney to keep
the juvenile case in adult court.91

Courts have attempted to decide whether extraordinary
circumstances exist in youth felony cases, beginning with the
legislative history and a dictionary definition of “extraordinary.”92
Courts have inferred that the Legislature intended that most
cases would be transferred to Family Court, except for what has
been described as “extremely rare and exceptional cases.”93 The
dictionary definition supports that view, defining extraordinary
as
“far
from
common . . . very
outstanding . . .
: very
remarkable.”94 However, neither the legislative history nor the
definition of extraordinary have helped courts make consistent
As a result, courts have resorted to
determinations.95
88

Mumola, supra note 12, at 551.
Patrick Harty, The Moral and Economic Advantages of Raising the Age of
Criminal Responsibility in New York Among Juvenile Offenders, and Plans for
Rehabilitation, 33 TOURO L. REV. 1099, 1103 (2017); see Lippman, supra note 87.
90
Eli Hager, The Fine Print in New York’s Raise the Age Law, THE MARSHALL
PROJECT (Apr. 14, 2017), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/04/14/the-fineprint-in-new-york-s-raise-the-age-law [https://perma.cc/3289-8JE3].
91
Mumola, supra note 12, at 551.
92
People v. J.P., 63 Misc. 3d 635, 646–50 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cnty. 2019).
93
Id. at 647.
94
Id. at 649–50 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
807 (1986)).
95
In People v. T.R., the court found that an Adolescent Offender (“AO”) charged
with allegedly conspiring to make a terroristic, bomb threat to his school was not
sufficient to amount to extraordinary circumstances because “conspiring
with . . . other children is hardly extraordinary” and “extraordinary circumstances
should not be based solely upon the sheer number of individuals affected.” People v.
T.R., 62 Misc. 3d 1219(A), 2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 51976(U), at *3 (Family Ct. Erie Cnty.
89
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determinations based on a variety of inappropriate factors: prior
juvenile history, culpability, and mental illness.
B.

Inconsistent Application Diminishes Effectiveness

1.

Violating the Family Court Act

One factor that courts rely on in their determination of
extraordinary circumstances is prior juvenile history.
For
example, in People v. J.P., the court, in considering a motion by
the prosecution to block the transfer of a youth to Family Court
based on extraordinary circumstances, noted the youth’s
“recalcitrant recidivism.”96 Specifically, the court recognized the
youth’s prior delinquency and youthful offender adjudications,
despite acknowledging that the youth had no criminal record.97
Other courts have considered the youth’s past violence,98 or
“extensive contacts” with the criminal justice system as an
aggravating factor in the determination.99 The justification
given for doing so is that Family Court is not equipped to
rehabilitate juvenile offenders and prevent reoffending.100
However, there are two major problems with this justification.
First, the justification is undermined by extensive studies finding
that juvenile recidivism is higher among youth who are
prosecuted in the criminal justice system.101 Second, and most
important, examining past juvenile delinquency is a direct
violation of the Family Court Act.102
The Family Court Act § 381.2 provides, in relevant part, that
the mere “fact that a person was before the family court . . . is
[not] admissible as evidence against him or his interests in any
An adjudication in Family Court is not
other court.”103

Dec. 21, 2018). This seemingly fits the dictionary definition of “extraordinary,” yet
the court was not convinced it was enough.
96
63 Misc. 3d at 651.
97
Id.
98
See People v. A.G., 62 Misc. 3d 1210(A), 2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 61693(U), at *2
(Sup. Ct. Queens Cnty. Dec. 20, 2018).
99
People v. M.M., 64 Misc. 3d 259, 262 (Nassau Cnty. Ct. 2019) (explaining the
youth’s “extensive contacts” with the criminal justice system as extraordinary
circumstances, including a “prior felony conviction and four prior misdemeanor
convictions as a juvenile delinquent”).
100
Id. at 268.
101
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
102
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 381.2 (McKinney 2020).
103
Id.
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considered a criminal conviction,104 and such records are kept
confidential.105 In People v. M.M., the court rejected the DA’s
arguments against transfer, citing to the New York Court of
Appeals for the proposition that “[a]s a rule, a juvenile
delinquency adjudication cannot be used against the juvenile in
any other court for any other purpose.”106 The rationale for this
rule fits the purpose of the RTA, which is to treat youthful
offenders as children in need of rehabilitation and treatment.
Although RTA made significant changes to the juvenile justice
system in New York, it did not intend to effectively override
existing Family Court statutes and rules. Furthermore, the
court there articulated that the burden rests with the legislature,
not the courts, to change existing statutes and allow past
adjudications to be assessed with respect to transfer.107
2.

At Odds with the Presumption of Innocence

Another factor that courts rely on in their determination of
extraordinary circumstances is culpability. For example, the
court in People v. J.W. assessed whether the youth was the
“mastermind,” or “leader of the criminal activity;”108 the court in
People v. M.M. assessed whether the youth was the “sole
participant” in the crime;109 and the court in People v. J.P.
assessed whether the youth was the “lesser actor” in the crime.110
The justification for this assessment was to determine whether
the AO is “amenable to [rehabilitation] services” of Family
Court,111 equating amenability to services with lesser culpability
in the crime.112 However, courts have seemingly failed to
recognize that the determination of extraordinary circumstances
104

See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 720.35 (McKinney 2014).
See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 381.3 (McKinney 2019).
106
People v. M.M., 64 Misc. 3d 259, 267 (Nassau Cnty. Ct. 2019) (emphasis
added) (citing Green v. Montgomery, 95 N.Y.2d 693, 697 (2001)).
107
Id. at 270 (“If the fact that an individual was previously adjudicated a
juvenile delinquent is to be considered in assessing factors against him with respect
to the potential removal of a case from the Youth Part to the Family Court, then
such consideration must be specifically authorized by the Legislature, not by this
Court.”).
108
People v. J.W., 69 Misc. 3d 1215(A), 2019 WL 1576074, at *3 (Family. Ct.
Erie Cnty. March 28, 2019).
109
M.M., 64 Misc. 3d at 262.
110
People v. J.P., 63 Misc. 3d 635, 643 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cnty. 2019).
111
J.W., 2019 WL 1576074, at *3.
112
People v. D.L., 62 Misc. 3d 900, 905 (Family Ct. Monroe Cty. 2018)
(“[C]hildren are less culpable in the criminal context than adults and more amenable
to change.”).
105
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is simply a ruling to determine which justice system the case
belongs in. A youth’s future is significantly determined by the
court that his or her case ends up in. For example, it is the
difference between a public criminal conviction, aimed at
punishment, and a private disposition, aimed at rehabilitation.
At this preliminary stage of the proceedings, the courts in these
cases are already weighing how guilty the youth is. Culpability,
defined in the legal sense, refers to blameworthiness, and
scholars note that “considerations of culpability . . . are most
crucial to an adjudication of guilt at a trial.”113 Thus, assessing
culpability at this point in the case has troubling implications for
a youth’s right to the presumption of innocence—a fundamental
aspect of American jurisprudence.114
In 1970, the United States Supreme Court held that
preserving the presumption of innocence for youth would not
disturb New York’s juvenile justice policies, including the policy
that a youth’s final disposition is not considered a criminal
conviction.115 Despite the Court’s failure to provide youth in the
juvenile justice system with the right to a trial,116 youth are still
entitled to have an attorney,117 present their defenses, and hold
the Government to the high standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.118 Since the burden rests on the DA, by way of
motion practice, to provide the court with a showing of
extraordinary circumstances, youth are unable to put forth an
effective defense, including one that diminishes culpability,
because of the inability to obtain discovery, confront witnesses, or
suppress evidence.119 Moreover, a court’s early assessment of
culpability presumably carries weight in subsequent proceedings.
For example, rather than having his or her case heard by an
113
R.J. Spjut, The Relevance of Culpability to the Punishment and Prevention of
Crime, 19 AKRON L. REV. 197, 201 (1985).
114
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) (explaining “[t]he presumption
of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a
fair trial under our system of criminal justice”). In 1970, the Court held that “[t]he
same considerations that demand extreme caution in factfinding to protect the
innocent adult apply as well to the innocent child.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365
(1970).
115
Winship, 397 U.S. at 365–66.
116
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (holding that a trial by
jury in the juvenile justice system is not required under the Constitution).
117
See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967); see supra text accompanying note 32.
118
Winship, 397 U.S. at 368.
119
Even though “[b]oth parties may be heard and submit information relevant to
the [Court’s] determination,” a defendant is not required to prove their innocence;
rather, the burden rests entirely on the DA. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 722.23(2)(b).

2020]

EXTRAORDINARY (CIRCUMSTANCES) INJUSTICE

1003

impartial judge once the proper jurisdiction is determined, a
court has essentially already ruled that the youth is culpable, or
legally responsible for the crime.
Therefore, the proper
procedure is crucial, especially considering the consequences of
having a case heard in Family Court versus Criminal Court—
procedure, outcome, and burdens of proof differ tremendously.
Courts have also relied on RTA’s three statutory factors—
significant physical injury, display of a weapon, or sex offense—
to aid in the determination of extraordinary circumstances.120
The factors are assessed by a standard of preponderance of the
evidence121—the same standard of proof weighed in Family Court
proceedings. For example, in People v. Y.L., the AO was charged
with attempted gang assault in the first degree based on his
participation in an alleged assault.122 The court held that the
People met the burden of a preponderance of the evidence that
the AO caused serious physical injury during the commission of
the crime.123 If these cases are then transferred to Family Court,
an essential component of the case has already been determined
by the same standard the court would be using to decide the
entirety of the case. Thus, using the preponderance standard for
purposes of procedure to determine which court system the case
belongs in is improper because the burden of overcoming that
standard and furnishing an effective defense is almost
impossible. Ultimately, the case is decided before the court even
determines which justice system it belongs in.
3.

Outweighing the Balance Using Mental Illness

One last factor that courts rely on in their determination of
extraordinary circumstances is mental illness. Rather than
considering mental illness as a single factor in an overall
determination, courts have seemingly used this as a complete
defense to mitigate any finding of extraordinary circumstances.124
In People v. R.M., the AO was charged with aggravated cruelty to
animals based on an allegation that she killed a cat and removed
The court found that no extraordinary
its organs.125
120

See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 722.23 (McKinney 2019).
Id.
122
People v. Y.L., 64 Misc. 3d 664, 665 (Monroe Cnty. Ct. 2019).
123
Id. at 670.
124
See, e.g., People v. R.M., 63 Misc. 3d 541, 547–48 (Westchester Cnty. Ct.
2018); People v. J.P., 63 Misc. 3d 635, 639, 650 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cnty. 2019); People
v. D.L., 62 Misc. 3d 900, 907 (Family Ct. Monroe Cnty. 2018).
125
63 Misc. 3d at 542.
121
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circumstances existed based on the youth’s long history of mental
illness, despite the court’s examination of the crime as “especially
depraved or sadistic.”126 In People v. D.L., the AO was charged
with attempted arson based on allegations that she intentionally
set fire to her former partner’s home with her child inside.127 The
court held that no extraordinary circumstances existed, in large
part because of the “assessment that she needed to speak to a
counselor and receive mental health assistance.”128 While mental
illness is undoubtedly a cause for concern, especially among
youth in the juvenile justice system,129 there is no guarantee that
youth who have a mental illness would be better off in the
juvenile justice system as opposed to the Youth Part of the
criminal justice system.
Scholars explain the complex relationship between mental
illness and contact with the criminal justice system by stating,
“[m]any end up in the system simply because they need mental
health services and can’t access them in their community.”130
However, only a small percentage of youth offenders with mental
health problems have access to treatment in the juvenile justice
system.131 For example, “[a] national study found that even if
juvenile justice facilities reported having the capacity to provide
services to youths in their care, youths with a severe mental
health disorder often did not receive any emergency mental
health services.”132 In addition, studies conducted in 2016
revealed that juvenile detention facilities were largely
overcrowded and lacked necessary treatment or services,
potentially leading to worsening mental health conditions.133
Thus, completely outweighing extraordinary circumstances based
126

Id. at 548.
62 Misc. 3d at 903.
128
Id. at 907.
129
NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES, MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS OF JUVENILE
OFFENDERS 2 (2011), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/jjguidebook-mental.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3SDS-WL2P] (“Between 65 percent and 70 percent of the 2 million
children and adolescents arrested each year in the United States have a mental
health disorder.”).
130
Juvenile
Justice,
NAT’L
ALLIANCE
ON
MENTAL
ILLNESS,
https://namibuckspa.org/about-nami-bucks-county/public-policy/juvenile-justice/
[https://perma.cc/X55V-VPWS] (last visited Oct. 19, 2020).
131
OFF. JUV. JUST. AND DELINQ. PREVENTION, INTERSECTION BETWEEN MENTAL
HEALTH
AND
THE
JUVENILE
JUSTICE
SYSTEM
4
(2017),
https://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg/litreviews/Intersection-Mental-Health-Juvenile-Justice.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4QG8-VBQ7] (last updated July 2017).
132
Id. at 5.
133
See id. at 5.
127
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on mental illness alone—in the hopes that youth will receive
adequate treatment in the juvenile justice system—is not only
improper, but it is also adding to the problem of overcrowding
and diminishing the incarcerated population’s access to
treatment. While it is recognized that more must be done to
address mental health problems among youth, outweighing
extraordinary circumstances is not the proper avenue for change.
Part III will explore the possibilities for change, specifically
suggesting the implementation of new ways to assess mental
illness among youth.
III. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
A.

A Model from Connecticut and Pennsylvania’s Raise the Age
Laws

Although New York has fallen short, it can learn from other
states, like Connecticut and Pennsylvania. In Connecticut, youth
begin in family court and may be transferred to criminal court
pursuant to certain charged offenses or present factors.134 Cases
are automatically transferred if the youth is charged with a
capital felony, a class A felony, or certain class B felonies.135 The
statute denies the automatic transfer of youth to the criminal
justice system if the charge is, for example: (1) manslaughter in
the first degree; (2) burglary in the first degree; (3) arson in the
second degree; or (4) robbery in the first degree.136 However,
unlike New York’s motion practice, a transfer hearing is instead
conducted to determine eligibility for transfer.137 Specific factors
that are examined include (1) probable cause to believe the youth
has committed the alleged act; (2) the best interests of the child
and the community; (3) mental disease or intellectual disability;
The transfer
and (4) seriousness of the alleged offense.138
hearing, unlike motion practice, takes into account youth’s rights
under the Constitution.139 At the hearing, “the child has the
right to counsel, to confront witnesses, to obtain discovery of
134

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b–127(a)(1) (West 2019).
Id.
136
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b–127(3) (West 2019).
137
Id.
138
Id. Probable cause, for example, is a common-sense determination and does
not require as much preliminary adjudication as culpability.
139
SANDRA NORMAN-EADY, ET. AL., CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, OFF. OF LEGIS.
RSCH., RE: JUVENILE JUSTICE (1994), https://www.cga.ct.gov/PS94/rpt/olr/htm/94-R0919.htm [https://perma.cc/VZC6-TN8G].
135
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vindicating information, and to suppress any admission made by
him.”140
Similarly, Pennsylvania youth also begin in Family Court
and may be transferred to criminal court pursuant to a
hearing.141 However, Pennsylvania is much more expansive in its
statute regarding factors to analyze for transfer purposes.142
Some of the factors Pennsylvania courts consider are (1) whether
a prima facie case against the youth exists; (2) whether the “act
would be considered a felony if committed by an adult;”
(3) impact of the offense on the victim and community; (4) threat
to public safety; (5) nature and circumstances of the alleged
offense; (6) mental capacity and maturity; and (7) adequacy of
dispositional alternatives.143 The statute also lists certain acts
that, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime, and
thus are ineligible for transfer: kidnapping, voluntary
manslaughter, rape, and aggravated assault.144
Both states’ approaches are practicable and exhibit two
effective models for the New York Legislature. Having a statute
that both lists factors to examine and specific crimes to identify—
either to automatically transfer to Family Court or automatically
remain in the Youth Part—is essential to the success of New
York’s RTA. The Legislature should amend the RTA to include
all of the factors mentioned above for a determination based on a
totality of the circumstances. Further, it must identify some
automatic offenses, like those listed in the Connecticut and
Pennsylvania statutes, to allow for a bright-line rule of transfer
or retainment.
Moreover, both statutes arguably offer a solution to the
concerns associated with the undefined concept of extraordinary
circumstances. The problems that may be associated with
determining culpability upon a motion for extraordinary
circumstances in New York are virtually non-existent in a state
where a hearing is held. First, youth have the ability to put on
an effective defense through the opportunity to diminish
culpability. Further, by establishing certain discretionary factors
to consider, the courts are given appropriate guidance for a

140

Id.
42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6355(a) (West 2020) (Transfer to
criminal proceedings).
142
Id. § 6355(a)(4).
143
Id.
144
Id. § 6355(g)(2).
141
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balancing or totality of the circumstances test. In essence, it
diminishes the likelihood that courts will resort to examining
factors that are inappropriate—such as prior history—or picking
and choosing one factor—such as mental illness—that outweighs
all the rest.
B.

Use of Blended Sentencing Laws

Lastly, the New York Legislature should incorporate a
blended sentencing model into the RTA. Generally, there are five
blended sentencing laws that have been used in various states
Scholars note that “under this
throughout the country.145
expanded sentencing authority, . . . judge[s] can step away from
the ‘all-or-nothing’ mentality of choosing one system over the
other and use both the juvenile system and the adult criminal
system to satisfy the desired goals.”146 Because youth charged
with felonies begin in the criminal justice system, the two options
available under blended sentencing laws are criminal-exclusive
blend or criminal-inclusive blend.147 The criminal-exclusive
model, which allows criminal courts to impose either a juvenile
justice disposition or a criminal sentence,148 may serve as the
solution to having to conduct a preliminary determination of the
existence of one of the three statutory factors under the RTA
when youth are charged with a violent felony.
For example, under the RTA, if the DA’s information alleges
significant physical injury, display of a weapon, or a sex offense,
the case should automatically be retained in the Youth Part of
the criminal justice system.149 This eliminates the preliminary
assessment of culpability to determine which court system the
case belongs in. Nonetheless, youth should have the opportunity
to have a hearing to present defenses to culpability at the next
145
Brandi Miles Moore, Blended Sentencing for Juveniles, 22 J. JUV. L. 126, 131
(2001) (listing juvenile-exclusive blend, juvenile-inclusive blend, juvenile-contagious
blend, criminal-exclusive blend, and criminal-inclusive blend).
146
Id. at 130–32.
147
Id. at 131. In the first three options, the juvenile justice system retains
jurisdiction, while the last two options give the criminal justice system jurisdiction.
Id.
148
PATRICIA TORBET, ET AL., OFF. OF JUV. JUST. AND DELINQ. PREVENTION,
STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME 12 (1996),
http://www.ncjj.org/pdf/statresp.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2QE-Z6BU].
149
Presumably, there should not be concerns regarding false allegations because
(1) supporting depositions must be signed under a penalty of perjury; and
(2) prosecutors and others charged with carrying out the laws of the state must
abide by a code of ethics that would prohibit such misconduct.

1008

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:989

stage of the case. Youth may present defenses including:
(1) there was no significant injury, or they were not the cause of
such injury; (2) there was no weapon displayed during the
commission of the crime; or (3) the sex offense alleged involves
the unreliability of uncorroborated, conflicting testimony. At the
close of the evidence, the judge would decide whether such
factors are present by a preponderance of the evidence. If one or
more are present, and the case is proven beyond a reasonable
doubt at the trial stage, the presence of the statutory factor
would act as an aggravating factor, allowing the criminal court to
impose a criminal sanction. However, if none are present, and
the case is proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the absence of any
statutory factor would act as a mitigating factor, allowing the
court to impose a juvenile disposition.150
This proposed approach satisfies the RTA’s intent to assess
culpability—based on injury, weapon, and sex offense—while at
the same time reserving the decision in the Youth Part for the
judge who will retain jurisdiction throughout the life of the case.
Further, the blended sentencing would make up for the inability
to assess the case for transfer to Family Court under this new
framework. In other words, if the factors are present, the case is
where it would have been if determined earlier and the youth
would have received a criminal sanction; if the factors are not
present, the case would have been transferred to Family Court
and the youth would have received a juvenile disposition.
Therefore, not only is this approach fair and equitable, it imposes
a stronger incentive for youth not to commit sex offenses, crimes
with weapons, or crimes of violence.
Lastly, this unique
approach eliminates the discretion granted to DAs to transfer the
cases regardless of a finding one or more of these factors and
eliminates the extraordinary circumstances determination from
courts altogether as it pertains to violent felonies.
C.

New Approach to Assessing Mental Illness Among Youth

Currently, to assess mental illness in youth, New York State
utilizes the Youth Assessment and Screening Instrument
(“YASI”)—a juvenile probationary tool implemented in 2001.151

150
Criminal court judges may benefit from training on the imposition of juvenile
dispositions, and vice versa.
151
ORBIS PARTNERS INC., LONG-TERM VALIDATION OF THE YOUTH ASSESSMENT
AND SCREENING INSTRUMENT (YASI) IN NEW YORK STATE JUVENILE PROBATION 1-1
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The goals of the YASI are “public safety, youth accountability,
and competency.”152 However, it is unclear whether the state
uses the YASI—or indeed, any of the common mental health
screening tools—during a youth’s initial contact with the
system.153 Therefore, it is understandable that youth in the
juvenile justice system are not provided with adequate
treatment; there is no standardized assessment and thus, no way
to determine what treatments are necessary.154 In accordance
with New York’s attitude toward reformation and rehabilitation,
an effective screening tool must be implemented in both the
juvenile justice system and the Youth Part. If extraordinary
circumstances are appropriately determined and the youth is
either transferred to Family Court—or retained in the Youth
Part—both systems would be equipped to assess mental illness
and provide effective treatment options.
The most common mental health assessment tool is the
Massachusetts Youth Screen Instrument (“MAYSI”).155 The
MAYSI focuses on behaviors and feelings that are often
associated with mental illness, rather than formal diagnostics.156
Youth are presented with fifty-two true-false statements across
nine scales, including alcohol/drug use, anger, anxiety, depressed
mood, fighting, somatic complaints, suicide ideation, thought
disturbance, and traumatic experiences.157 The score outcomes
are then matched up with “clinically significant levels.”158 For
example, if a youth reaches the cut-off score, he or she is
presumed to have specific mental health needs; or if a youth
scores above a level of “caution” or “warning,” intervention
(2007),
https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/opca/pdfs/YASI-Long-Term-ValidationReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/JF38-ZRF9].
152
Technology Advancing Practices, N.Y. DIV. OF CRIM. JUST. SERVS.,
https://stage.criminaljustice.ny.gov/opca/technology.htm [https://perma.cc/H82Q-JXY9]
(last visited Feb. 28, 2021).
153
ANDREW WACHTER, JUV. JUST. GEOGRAPHY, POL’Y, PRAC. & STAT., MENTAL
HEALTH
SCREENING
IN
JUVENILE
JUSTICE
SERVICES
2
(2015),
http://nysap.us/JJGPS%20StateScan%20Mental%20Health%20Screening%20in%20
Juvenile%20Justice%202015_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/CP4M-Q3EB].
154
NAT’L CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH AND JUV. JUST., MENTAL HEALTH SCREENING
IN JUVENILE JUSTICE SETTINGS 2 (2016), http://adq631j7v3x1shge52cot6m1wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Mental-Health-Screening-inJuvenile-Justice-Settings-for-WEBSITE.pdf [https://perma.cc/BE9A-3DDK].
155
WACHTER, supra note 153, at 3.
156
Thomas Grisso, Juvenile Offenders and Mental Illness, 6 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCH.
& L. 143, 148 (1999).
157
Id.
158
Id.
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should be considered.159 The advantages of the MAYSI are that
the instrument can “identify every youth’s mental status within
24 hours after entering detention centers, [takes] no more than
10 minutes to administer, and require[s] no clinical expertise.”160
Once mental illness is preliminarily evaluated, more indepth assessments can be conducted by experienced
psychologists161 for the purposes of “problem identification,
diagnosis, and treatment planning for youth.”162 Both the
Minnesota
Multiphasic
Personality
Inventory-Adolescent
(“MMPI-A) and the Million Adolescent Clinical Inventory
(“MACI”) are commonly utilized for these purposes.163 For
example, the MMPI-A measures childhood psychopathology of
youth and provides information on symptomatic behavior and
diagnostic treatment considerations.164 The MACI, on the other
hand, measures “early signs of Axis I and Axis II disorders” and
provides information on substance abuse proneness, suicidal
tendency, and eating dysfunctions.165 A combination of all three
assessments will not only put New York on a progressive path
toward identifying mental illness among youth, but it will also
provide youth with better access to mental health services,
regardless of the court system in which they are placed.
CONCLUSION
While the RTA was successfully passed in New York, there is
still much work to be done to improve and ensure continued
success. Unfortunately, given the poorly crafted legislation, the
courts and district attorneys are essentially free to ignore the
law. If the RTA is not amended, or the system fails to correct

159

Id.
Id. The accuracy of the self-reports is later confirmed by clinical
psychologists. Id.
161
Id.
162
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-Adolescent, PEARSON,
https://www.pearsonassessments.com/store/usassessments/en/Store/ProfessionalAssessments/Personality-%26-Biopsychosocial/Minnesota-Multiphasic-PersonalityInventory-Adolescent/p/100000465.html [https://perma.cc/382D-24V2] (last visited
Feb. 28, 2021, 8:01PM).
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Grisso, supra note 156, at 148.
164
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-Adolescent, supra note 162.
165
Millon
Adolescent
Clinical
Inventory,
PEARSON,
https://www.pearsonassessments.com/store/usassessments/en/Store/Professional
-Assessments/Personality-%26-Biopsychosocial/Millon-Adolescent-Clinical-Inventory/p/100000667.html?tab=product-details [https://perma.cc/N3FX-L2KL] (last visited Mar.
4, 2021).
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these recurring problems, the legislation may ultimately fail. If
this legislation fails, not only will there be an absence of real
juvenile justice reform, but there is also a profound risk that
youth will continue to feel the effects of the old system that New
York so desperately tried to abolish. Incorporating appropriate
factors to examine and specifying crimes to consider under the
“extraordinary circumstances” analysis, reorganizing the way
courts assess culpability, and repairing the mental health system
for youth are three essential avenues for change. As the saying
goes, it’s back to the drawing board, New York.

